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Abstract To what extent can we speak of a distinctively ‘European’ security approach
towards the Asia-Pacific region? In order to address that timely question, this article
examines how Britain, France, Germany and the European Union (EU) are framing their
evolving security roles in the Asia-Pacific region, and how those individual perspectives
intersect with each other. The article identifies a number of important common features in
Europe’s approaches towards security in the Asia-Pacific, namely the tendency of most
European actors to emphasize the economic and diplomatic nature of their contribution to
regional security, their promotion of regional multilateral security fora, their rejection of
the notion that China’s rise is inherently challenging for regional and global security, and
their willingness to signal their differences towards Washington’s emphasis on military
power and alliance-based approach. However, and despite the existence of common
traits, individual European actors show different degrees of closeness vis-à-vis the US
and China and feature different perspectives regarding which security relationships they
should prioritize in the region (if any), or the appropriate balance between diplomacy and
security and defence cooperation. Such divergences prevent Europeans from developing
a coherent security profile in the region and preclude us from speaking of a distinctively
European security approach towards the Asia-Pacific.
The Asia-Pacific region has emerged out of the global financial crisis as the main
engine of global economic growth. The region holds the largest proportion of the
world’s foreign currency reserves (Lai and Ravenhill 2012) and has recently replaced
North America as Europe’s most important trading partner (European Commission
2015). However, geopolitical tensions in the Korean Peninsula, the East and South
China Seas, and Taiwan constitute ongoing threats to stability in the Asia-Pacific, and
cast a shadow upon Europe’s own economic interests in the region. In addition to that,
the geopolitical rise of the Asia-Pacific has important implications for Europeans
elsewhere. Their growing need for energy and raw materials is leading Asian countries
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westwards onto parts of the European neighbourhood, notably the Middle East and
Africa (Simón 2015). Against this backdrop, there is a widespread recognition that
Europe’s own prosperity and security have become increasingly dependent on eco-
nomic growth and geopolitical stability in the Asia-Pacific (Korteweg 2014; Reiterer
2014; Simón 2015). In turn, the main Asia-Pacific powers (notably China, Japan and
South Korea) have become important players in the fight against non-traditional global
security threats, such as climate change, maritime piracy or international terrorism, and
offer important opportunities for cooperation with Europeans at that level (Hwee 2004).
In recent years, questions related to the rise of Asia and its implications for
Europeans have generated much attention amongst European foreign and security
policy scholars. Much of this attention has focused on Europe’s main powers and their
evolving security priorities in the Asia-Pacific (see, e.g. Blount 2013; Butler 2006;
Heiduk 2015; Godement 2014; Kundnani 2014; Moni 2006). In turn, the question of
the EU’s security role and emerging relationships in the Asia-Pacific is also generating
considerable coverage in academic journals and think tank publications (see, e.g.
Berkofsky 2014; Keohane 2012; Kirchner 2005; Murray 2008; Stumbaum 2015;
Reiterer 2014; Youngs 2015). However, the crucial question of how the security roles
of Europe’s main powers and institutions in the Asia-Pacific intersect with each other
has been rather neglected in the literature (for a notable exception, see Kerr and Xu
2014). In fact, it has become commonplace to speak of the EU's role in Asia and that of
Europe almost interchangeably (see, e.g. von Hofmann 2007; Korteweg 2014;
Tsuruoka 2013). This conflation is somewhat problematic. Not least, Europe’s leading
powers use the EU to channel some of their security priorities and initiatives towards
the Asia-Pacific, but not others. Because of its ‘normative’ orientation (Manners 2002)
and emphasis on economic cooperation and multilateralism, the EU can prove rather
useful to Europe’s leading member states whenever they want to emphasize the
‘economic’ and ‘diplomatic’ nature of their engagement in the Asia-Pacific, signal
their differences with Washington’s military and alliance-based approach and convey
an image of geopolitical equidistance vis-à-vis regional security questions. However,
there is more to that. In fact, when engaging in security and defence cooperation in the
Asia-Pacific, Europe’s key powers tend to show a preference for bilateralism. Thus, any
effort to understand the security role Europeans are playing in Asia must necessarily
take into account a wide variety of actors and initiatives.
This article addresses the question of to what extent we can speak of a distinctively
‘European’ security approach towards the Asia-Pacific. To do so, it examines Europe’s
security role(s) in the Asia-Pacific through the lens of Britain, France, Germany and the
EU, and analyses how those individual approaches intersect with each other. In
illuminating these four individual angles, the article identifies common features as well
as contradictory elements. Something (most) Europeans share is their tendency to
emphasize the economic and diplomatic nature of their engagement in the Asia-
Pacific, as well as their preference for multilateral solutions to regional security
challenges. This way, Europeans typically try to chart their own course—one that
contrasts with Washington’s alliance-based approach and greater emphasis on military
power. Relatedly, most Europeans avoid taking a clear stance on territorial disputes in
the Asia-Pacific, strive to maintain so-called ‘partnerships’ with different Asia-Pacific
powers and often eschew the notion that China’s rise is inherently challenging for the
regional and global order.
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Beyond these common traits, however, individual European approaches to security
in the Asia-Pacific vary significantly. Britain tends to attach greater importance (than
other Europeans) to developing bilateral security and defence ties with ‘like-minded’
democracies and traditional US allies in region, a practice that contrasts with the lack of
any meaningful security dialogue with China. Having said this, London is also very
much interested in furthering its investment and trade ties with China, which may partly
explain why it adopts a softer tone (than the US) on territorial disputes in the South and
East China seas. In contrast to Britain, the military-strategic component is practically
absent from Germany’s approach towards the Asia-Pacific, which is driven by an
emphasis on trade, diplomacy and multilateralism. Berlin is focused on developing
links to regional multilateral security organizations and eschews any appearance of
favoring the security interests of any regional countries over those of others, notably
China. Such an approach serves well Berlin's (growing) economic interests in the Asia-
Pacific. France stands somewhere in between, as it seeks to balance its emerging
bilateral strategic relationships with countries like Japan or Australia with an ongoing
military-to-military dialogue with China and publicly highlights the contrast between
its own emphasis on diplomacy and multilateralism and Washington’s alliance-based
and military-oriented approach. These variations amongst the key European powers also
reflect in the EU, whosemain concern is to continue to develop its relations with its main
economic partners in the Asia-Pacific (especially China), and its security engagement in
the region is dominated by an emphasis on diplomacy and multilateralism.
The article draws on an analysis of official documents and public pronunciations
produced by the four European actors under examination, as well as over 15 confidential
interviews with British, French, German and EU officials. The first section introduces
some of the main security challenges currently affecting the Asia-Pacific region and
outlines their potential implications for European security. The second section examines
the evolving security role of Britain, France, Germany and the EU in the Asia-Pacific as
well as their engagement with the region’s main actors. The third section features a
cross-case analysis that seeks to draw some conclusions about the similarities and
differences in the way Europe’s main powers engage in/with the Asia-Pacific.
The Asia-Pacific: main security trends and implications for Europe
Most contemporary discussions on Asian security revolve around the geopolitical
implications of the rise of China (see, e.g. Buzan 2010; Ikenberry 2008; Shambaugh
2004/5). Over the last decade, China has become the main engine of economic growth
in the Asia-Pacific to such an extent that the economic growth and well-being of many
countries in the region are largely dependent on their ties to that country (Shambaugh
2004/5). This has given Beijing increasing economic and diplomatic leverage through-
out the region and beyond. Moreover, its strong economic growth has presided over an
expansion of Chinese political confidence as well as a process of military moderniza-
tion. This, in turn, has strengthened Beijing’s political confidence and strategic position
vis-à-vis long-standing regional territorial disputes, i.e. Taiwan, East China Sea, and
South China Sea, and led to widespread speculation as to whether China is—or might
soon be—in a position to challenge the existing regional security order (see, e.g.
Holslag 2014).
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The lack of clarity regarding China’s strategic intentions prompted the US
Department of Defense to announce a ‘rebalancing’ towards the Asia-Pacific region
in early 2012 (Department of Defense, 2012). Ever since, the US has devoted greater
strategic resources to the Asia-Pacific region and strengthened its bilateral defence
relations with a number of key allies and partners, notably Japan, Australia, Singapore,
the Philippines or Vietnam (Lord and Erickson 2014). To be sure, the US has not yet
abandoned its broader aim of turning China into a ‘responsible stakeholder’ in the
international system. Washington recognizes China’s importance to regional and global
economic stability, as well as its potential role vis-à-vis important global security
challenges, including nuclear proliferation, climate change, cyber-security, etc.
(Ikenberry 2008). However, the erosion of the regional military balance and China’s
increasing assertiveness in the East and South China seas have led many in Washington
to embrace the idea that the US is in a competitive strategic relationship with China
(see, e.g. Mahnken 2012)
Several countries in the Asia-Pacific have also expressed growing concerns about
the potential implications of China’s geopolitical and strategic rise for regional security.
This has been particularly felt in those countries that have territorial disputes with
China in the East and South China Seas. Perhaps, most notably, Japan is adopting an
increasingly pro-active stance towards regional security issues. Ever since Prime
Minister Abe’s re-election in December 2012, Tokyo has increased its defence budget
and eased the legal restrictions on its Self-Defense Forces, strengthened its bilateral
alliance with the US and expanded its diplomatic role and security ties with a number
of South East Asian countries (see, e.g. Watanabe 2015). For their part, countries like
Vietnam or the Philippines worry about China’s increasing assertiveness in the South
China Sea and have sought to strengthen their own military and maritime surveillance
capabilities, reinforce their bilateral ties with the US and embraced Japan’s adoption of
a more pro-active regional role (Malesky and Morris-Jung 2014; Sidel 2014).
Most of the countries that are not immersed in territorial disputes with China (i.e.
South Korea, Thailand, Malaysia) want to avoid being perceived as taking any sides in
any such disputes as well as in relation to the emerging process of geostrategic
competition between China and the US. While they understand that the rise of China
could upset the regional balance of power, and even welcome greater US strategic
engagement in the region, they value their economic and political ties with the Asian
giant too much to even give the appearance of taking part in any sort of regional
coalition to counter-balance the rise of China. This logic broadly applies to ASEAN
itself, which, despite including some members that have territorial disputes with China,
avoids implicating itself in such disputes as an institution and prefers to frame its
dialogue with China around economic issues (Rolls 2012).
Even though the US and those regional countries implicated in territorial disputes
value enormously their economic and diplomatic ties with China (Kim 2015), the
regional security picture is becoming increasingly polarized. What does that bear for
Europeans? On the one hand, attitudes towards the US and the transatlantic relationship
play an important role in framing European security perceptions of the Asia-Pacific
(Simón 2015). One clear manifestation of that is the ongoing EU-wide arms embargo
against China. On the other hand, their geographical distance from the Asia-Pacific,
their lack of formal defence commitments there (bare some exceptions) and their
relative incapacity to project military-strategic power into the region means
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Europeans are well-positioned to exercise some form of mediating security role by
way of diplomacy and an emphasis on multilateralism and economic cooperation.
Many in Europe believe such an approach would play to Europe’s own strengths
and is the only way to avoid greater regional polarization and tensions (see, e.g.
Reiterer 2014). Some form of ‘go between’ role, so the logic goes, could reap
important diplomatic and economic dividends for Europeans, as it would both
enhance their diplomatic room of manoeuvre and allow them to continue to
expand their economic ties to all parties.
An emphasis on diplomacy, multilateralism and economic cooperation would help
shift the conversation away from the military-strategic balance, a question where,
allegedly, Europeans do not have much to contribute. These sorts of arguments are
generally used in relation to the EU, an actor known for its ‘soft power’ and multilateral
credentials (Scott 2014). However, some scholars argue that they also apply to most
European powers, in that their security profile in the region is rather testimonial and
their main concern is to maintain their economic ties to the key regional powers,
especially China (see, e.g. Casarini 2015; Kundnani 2014). Admittedly, these maxims
do hold true for most European actors, but they do so to different degrees and in
different ways. After all, all Europeans are relatively incapable of projecting strategic
power into the Asia-Pacific, but some are more capable than others. Conversely, they
all attach much importance to maintaining strong economic (and diplomatic) ties with
China, but some attach just as much importance—perhaps even more—to their strate-
gic relationship with the US and long-standing (bilateral) security ties with like-minded
Asian countries.
To what extent, then, can we speak of a ‘distinctively’ European security approach
towards the Asia-Pacific? In order to address that question, the next section examines
how Britain, France, Germany and the EU frame their evolving security profiles in the
Asia-Pacific. In doing so, it paves the way for the second section, which looks at how
the approaches of Europe’s main powers and institutions intersect with each other. In
order to operationalize the research question, both the next section and the cross-case
analysis featured in ‘Making sense of diversity: is there a ‘distinctively’ European
security approach towards the Asia-Pacific?’ revolve around the attitudes of Europe’s
main powers and institutions towards four interrelated themes, namely the role of the
US in the region, the rise of China, the balance between diplomacy and military
instruments and between multilateralism and bilateralism. By focusing the analysis
on these four key aspects of Europe’s evolving role in the region, the article aims to
provide a framework through which patterns of convergence and divergence in
European security approaches towards the Asia-Pacific can be identified. This, in turn,
should provide a foundation to address the question of whether we can speak of a
distinctively European security approach towards the Asia-Pacific region.
European security perspectives towards the Asia-Pacific
Britain and the Asia-Pacific: global power and global responsibilities
Britain defines itself as an ‘open, outward-facing nation’ that constitutes a ‘vital
economic and political link in the global network’ (United Kingdom Cabinet Office
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2010: 3–4). As such, it understands that its own security is directly tied to the upholding
of its interests and values in the world. Upholding such interests requires ‘the capability
to act well beyond its shores’ and to work with its allies—‘principally the United
States’—to ‘have a strategic presence wherever it is needed’ (UK Cabinet Office 2010:
4). The ability to project military power on a global scale and the ‘special’ relationship
with the US are core tenets of UK foreign policy and are therefore indispensable to
understand Britain’s evolving security role in the Asia-Pacific.
As a globally oriented ‘seapower , Britain is arguably uniquely positioned amongst
Europeans to engage strategically in the Asia-Pacific—a distinctively maritime geopo-
litical environment. The British government’s recent decision to ‘return East of Suez
through the opening of a number of military installations in the Persian Gulf, the
reinvigoration of the Royal Navy and the ongoing efforts to deepen strategic ties with
India (especially in the maritime domain) are most telling in this regard. Britain’s
increasing emphasis and presence in the Indian Ocean (including its base in Diego
Garcia) clearly underscores its ability to project strategic power to the Pacific (Stokes
and Newton 2014; Kelly and Stansfield 2013; Rogers 2013). Furthermore, its special
relationship with the US and the latter’s intention to rebalance its strategic priorities
towards the Asia-Pacific constitute both a reason and an asset to further British
engagement with that region’s security dynamics (Blount 2013). In the words of
(former) UK Foreign Secretary William Hague, ‘The UK understands that a stable
and prosperous Asia-Pacific matters to British interests. And in a networked world,
where physical geographical distance becomes steadily less important in determining
global affairs, this will continue to grow as a shared interest in relations between the
UK and US’ (Hague 2014).
The legacy of the empire continues to manifest itself through multiple cultural and
political ties between Britain and the Asia-Pacific to this day. Notably, the ‘Asia-
Pacific’ is home to Hong Kong (which was part of the UK until 1997) as well as a
number of Commonwealth countries including Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia,
Singapore, Brunei, Papua New Guinea, as well as the islands of Solomon, Samoa,
Nauru, Kirimati, Tonga and Vanuatu. Indeed, its colonial heritage and historical role
continue to mediate Britain’s engagement and interests in the Asia-Pacific. Not least,
such heritage translates into ongoing defence commitments to a number of like-minded
countries, all of which maintain either alliances or special security relationships with
the US. Britain’s security commitments in the Asia-Pacific are enshrined in three formal
treaties. The first is the Collective Security Treaty in South-East Asia, also known as
the ‘Manila Treaty , signed on 8 September 1954 by Australia, New Zealand, France,
Pakistan and including Bangladesh, the Philippines, Thailand, the UK and the US.
Even though the SEATO (the military organization that emanated from such Treaty)
was disbanded in 1977, the treaty remains in force.
Britain is also a member of the United Nations Command Military Armistice
Commission in Korea (UNCMAC), by which it is legally bound to contribute to the
upholding of the status quo in the Korean Peninsula. Last but not least, Britain also
takes part in the Five Powers Defence Arrangements (FPDA). Signed in 1971 between
the UK, Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore, the FPDA commits each of
the parties to consult with each other in the event of external aggression or threat of
attack against Peninsular Malaysia or Singapore. However, since its inception, the
FPDA has gone beyond its initial emphasis on the air defence of peninsular Malaysia
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and Singapore to address asymmetric threats, maritime security issues and humanitar-
ian assistance and disaster relief tasks (Thayer 2007).
Multilateralism is also an important feature in Britain’s security approach to the
Asia-Pacific. Beyond the more formal, alliance-type commitments, Britain is present in
a number of regional multilateral security initiatives and fora in the Asia-Pacific. In
2012, Britain joined the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and
Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP). ReCAAP was established in 2004
and includes most nations from North East Asia (including China), South East Asia and
South Asia as well as the US and a number of European countries (Britain, Denmark,
the Netherlands and Norway). Its purpose is to combat piracy and armed robbery
against ships in South East Asia, for which it leans on the establishment of an
Information Sharing Centre in Singapore. Britain is also a regular participant in the
Shangri-La Dialogue (an intergovernmental security forum attended by over 20 Asia-
Pacific and South Asian countries plus Britain, France and Germany held annually in
Singapore by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, a British think tank), the
USPACOM Chiefs of Defence Conference (held annually and involving all countries
from the Asian and American rims of the Pacific plus Britain and France) or the annual
Asia-Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference, which involves directors of military
intelligence from about 30 nations from the Asia-Pacific and South Asia as well as
Canada, Britain and France. In addition to that, Britain participates regularly in
RIMPAC, the world’s largest multilateral naval exercise.
Its state-of-the art naval capabilities, its expanding basing infrastructure in the Indian
Ocean (most notably in Diego Garcia) and its longstanding strategic ties with a number
of Asia-Pacific countries (especially Australia and Singapore) underpin Britain’s ability
to project strategic power onto the Asia-Pacific and substantiate its security commit-
ments in South East Asia and the South Pacific. Not least, Britain maintains to this day
a (limited) military footprint in South East Asia confined to Brunei and Singapore. In
Brunei, Britain keeps a 900-strong permanent garrison, predominantly drawn from the
Ghurkhas. The purpose of the garrison is to provide security for the country as a whole,
and the costs are borne by the Brunei Sultan (Humphrey 2012). In Singapore (the
historical hub of British naval power in the Far East), the UK retains to this day a large
fuel depot and berthing wharves in Sembewang dockyard, which can provide berthing
access for up to three escorts at a time plus access to fuel and spare parts. Moreover,
London maintains a wider set of individual exchange posts, particularly in Australia
and New Zealand, as well as defence attaches in Australia, New Zealand, Brunei,
China, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia and Singapore.1
One of the most notable developments relating to Britain’s expanding security role
in the Asia-Pacific has been the decision to develop a strategic relationship with Japan.
In April 2012, UK Prime Minister David Cameron and (former) Japanese Prime
Minister Yoshihiko Noda issued a joint statement pledging to enhance strategic ties
between their two countries. The pledge resulted in the signing of UK–Japan Defence
Equipment Cooperation Framework and an Information Security Agreement in
July 2013. These two security agreements, the first of such kind between Japan and a
country other than the US, have paved the way for bilateral strategic cooperation at
various levels, including armaments research and development, intelligence sharing,
1 Author’s interview with UK defence official in London, 17 December 2014.
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military-to-military cooperation and military educational exchanges, etc.2 They also
include a track 2 dialogue involving Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies and
Britain’s Royal United Services Institute. The UK–Japan strategic partnership concen-
trates primarily on the security of ‘the global commons, on the high seas, in cyberspace
and in outer space’ and on deepening military-to-military and industrial ties (Foreign
and Commonwealth Office 2014). However, bilateral UK–Japan strategic pronuncia-
tions explicitly avoid any references to security issues directly related to the Asia-
Pacific, beyond ‘recognizing’ that region’s ‘increasing importance’ (Foreign and
Commonwealth Office 2014). This appears to be a deliberate attempt on Britain's part
to avoid excessively alienating China.3
Like other European countries, Britain ‘does not take a position on the underlying
issues of sovereignty in the South and East China Seas’ (Swire 2014). London
encourages all the countries in the region to ‘build mutual trust, be transparent about
their military development, work for regional stability, and settle disputes in accordance
with international law’ (Swire 2014). Britain’s unwillingness to take a clear stance on
regional territorial disputes is perhaps partly explained by the increasing importance it
attaches to China, which is key to consolidating London’s position as a key global hub
in Europe–Asia financial trade. Britain is, by far, the first destination of Chinese
Foreign Direct Investment into Europe and aspires to become the world’s most
important clearing house for renminbi trading outside of China (Casarini 2015).
Interestingly, in mid-2015, Britain was the first big European country to announce it
would join the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), ignoring US
warnings about the bank’s potential to challenge the Western-led global financial
institutions and thus assist China’s regional rise.
Having said this, London reserves for itself the right to express its opinion whenever
thinking that ‘one country or another is behaving provocatively and that regional
stability is being put at risk’ (Swire 2014). In what seems yet another reference to
China’s increasingly assertive stance in the East and South China Seas, London insists
that ‘great power invokes great responsibility, and those countries that are, or aspire to
be, great powers have a duty to take seriously their responsibility towards other nations
in the region… to be candid about their intentions, to be transparent about their
motives, and to be more open about their capabilities’ (Hammond 2014).
France and the Asia-Pacific: is strategic equidistance sustainable?
Like Britain, France prides itself on being one of the few European countries that has a
global approach to security. Its nuclear status, its permanent member status in the UN
Security Council and its possession of global power projection capabilities and an
extensive diplomatic, intelligence and overseas basing network substantiate that aspi-
ration. However, for all the interest in keeping the ‘global power narrative alive,
French strategic documents clearly identify Europe and its ‘extended southern
neighbourhood (running from the Gulf of Guinea in the west, through the Sahel-
Maghreb ‘continuum and the Mediterranean and Red Sea onto the Gulf of Aden and
the Western Indian Ocean) as the country’s main political and strategic referents (Simón
2 Author’s interview with UK defence official in Brussels, 14 January 2015.
3 Author’s interview with UK defence official in Brussels, 14 January 2015.
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2013). Having said that, France acknowledges the increasing economic and strategic
importance of what it refers to as the Asia-Pacific and has recently taken a number of
initiatives aimed at strengthening its presence there (French Ministry of Defense 2013).
France justifies its interest in Asia-Pacific security dynamics on three main counts.
Firstly, its ambition to remain a global power comes with ‘special global security
responsibilities’, and that certainly includes a commitment to security and stability in
the Asia-Pacific (French Ministry of Defense 2014). Its membership of the UNMilitary
Armistice Commission in Korea and its presence in a number of regional multilateral
security fora and initiatives (i.e. Shangi-La Dialogue, USPACOM Chiefs of Defence
Conference, Asia-Pacific Intelligence Chiefs Conference, RIMPAC) bear testament to
this fact. Secondly, its colonial heritage binds France to the Asia-Pacific culturally and
diplomatically. This is illustrated by the membership of Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam
of the International Organization of the Francophonie (of which Thailand is also an
observer) as well as by France’s membership in the Collective Security Treaty in South
East Asia or Manila Treaty. Last but not least, its territories in the South Pacific Ocean
(New Caledonia, Wallis and Futuna, French Polynesia, and Clipperton Island) make
France a resident power in the Asia-Pacific writ large.
France not only sees Asia as ‘the main driver of growth worldwide’ and acknowl-
edges that region’s ‘vital role in globalization’, but also shows concern about the fact
that ‘the risks of tension and conflict’ there ‘are among the highest in the world’
(French Ministry of Defense 2013: 56). In France’s mind, Europe’s economic prosper-
ity and security are directly affected by developments in the Asia-Pacific region. In
particular, the 2013 French White Paper on Defence and National Security singles out
the security of the Indian Ocean, ‘Europe’s main maritime access to Asia’, as a priority
for France and for Europe (French Ministry of Defense 2013: 26). Notably, France
maintains some 2600 soldiers and several air combat and naval units permanently
stationed in the Indian Ocean Region distributed alongside its several sovereign
territories in that ocean (Mayotte, Reunion and the Scattered Islands as well as the
French Southern and Antarctic Territories) and its overseas military installations in the
United Arab Emirates and Djibouti. Those forces are in a state of high readiness and are
thus available to be deployed to the Asia-Pacific theatre should the need to do so arise
(French Ministry of Defense 2014: 10).
Its sovereign territories in the South Pacific come with very specific security and
defence responsibilities. France maintains over 2500 military and civilian defence staff
permanently stationed in the South Pacific, the Armed Forces in New Caledonia
(FANC) and those in French Polynesia (FAPF) ensure the protection and safety of
French territories, the surveillance of the exclusive economic zones and the State’s
action at sea. As a resident Pacific power, France is also involved in a number of sub-
regional security fora in the South Pacific (i.e. the South Pacific Defence Ministers’
Meeting, the South Pacific Chiefs of Defence Conference and the Central and South
Pacific Coast Guard Forum) as well as in the broader Western Pacific (i.e. Western
Pacific Naval Symposium).
France identifies the ‘legacy conflicts of the Cold War’ (in the Korean peninsula,
between Russia and Japan, and in the Taiwan Strait) and ‘territorial disputes in South
and East Asia’ as the main sources of geopolitical tension in the Asia-Pacific region and
acknowledges that these could lead to an open conflict (French Ministry of Defense
2014: 4). Beyond calling all parties to respect international law and the freedom of
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navigation, and claiming its own special global responsibilities (as a Permanent
member of the UN Security Council), France does not take a particular stance in
territorial disputes. In fact, France often sees ‘equidistance’ as a useful referent to
define its strategic stance in the region (Godement 2014).
France’s efforts to strike a narrative of ‘strategic equidistance in the Asia-Pacific
manifest themselves in different ways. One is to emphasize a certain degree of distance
from the US. In the words of French Foreign Minister Laurent Fabius, some ‘form of a
Chinese-American G2’ (…) ‘would mean a loss of strategic independence’ or ‘even an
obligation to choose’ for Europe and the countries of South East Asia (Fabius 2013a).
Indeed, what ‘draws together ASEAN, Europe and France is the determination to build
a genuine, organized multi-polar world, in which the EU and ASEAN play a stabilizing
role.’ (Fabius 2013a) Admittedly, France is ‘undertaking a Bpivot^ to Asia’, but it is
doing so ‘not to follow the crowd’ (i.e. the US) but because it ‘wants to be present
where tomorrow’s world is built’ (Fabius 2013a). Moreover, in contrast to the US pivot
to Asia, which is ‘primarily military’, France’s own pivot is ‘more diplomatic’ (Fabius
2013a).
In France’s view, the best way to mitigate current geopolitical tensions and security
risks in the Asia-Pacific is through the promotion of multilateral such as the ASEAN
Regional Forum.4 Indeed, France sees ASEAN—an organization it considers to be
partly inspired by the EU—as the embryo for a multilateral and stable regional
architecture for peace and security in the Asia-Pacific (Fabius 2013a). Paris conceives
of its own security role in the region as being primarily confined to transnational
threats, especially ‘combatting terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruc-
tion and their means of delivery, cyber threats, as well as in favour of the security of
global sea lanes of communication’ (Fabius 2013a).
Reaching out to China is also an important part of French efforts to show ‘strategic
equidistance in Asia.5 France perceives China to be an ‘essential partner’, particularly
given its enormous economic potential, and its status as a permanent member of the
United Nations Security Council and growing global power, which make it key to the
resolution of international crises and the seeking of solutions to global challenges
(Fabius 2013a: 4). Moreover, Paris believes ‘China has thus far not been an expan-
sionist power’ and believes it is its responsibility to contribute to ‘bolstering that
choice’ through engagement (Fabius 2013b). This largely explains its interest in further
developing its strategic ties with China and fostering a military-to-military dialogue
with that country (French Ministry of Defense 2014). In fact, France is one of the main
exporters of dual-use technology to China, which is serving to bolster the capabilities of
the People’s Liberation Army as well as those of the Chinese coast guard.6
Over the last 2 years, France has also sought to further its security ties with Japan. At
a bilateral meeting in June 2013, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and French
President Francois Hollande vowed to strengthen the security relationship between
their countries and decided to set up a ‘two plus two’ process—an annual meeting of
their respective foreign and defence ministers. The first Franco-Japanese ‘two plus two’
4 Authors’ interviews with various French defence foreign policy and defence officials in Paris, May 2014-
May 2015.
5 Authors’ interview with French defence official in Paris, 19 May 2014.
6 Author’s interviews with multiple European officials in Tokyo and Seoul, Nov 2014.
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took place in January 2014 in Pari and focused on identifying key avenues for future
cooperation, including the possible joint development of military equipment, greater
intelligence ties, military-to-military cooperation (especially in the realm of maritime
security and anti-piracy) and cooperation in the realm of civilian nuclear energy
(Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2014).
While both parties are committed to furthering their security ties, France is keen to
avoid the perception that its ties to Japan are motivated by its willingness to mitigate the
(regional) challenges associated with the rise of China. 7 Particularly telling in this
regard were Laurent Fabius’ remarks in the French Senate just before the first Franco-
Japanese ‘two plus two’ meeting in Paris, where he proclaimed that ‘in a multipolar
world’, France does ‘not have to choose between China, Russia, or even Japan’ (Sénat
de France 2014). This would seem to (partly) explain France’s preference for directing
its security conversations with Japan onto industrial and global issues (i.e. anti-piracy,
peacekeeping, cyber-security, etc.), where potential frictions with China would be less
manifest.8 For its part, Tokyo has protested on several occasions to Paris due to the
latter’s continuous transfer of dual-use systems to China, which Japan believes are
serving to strengthen China’s coast guard capability and thus undermining the balance
of power and stability in South East Asia.9
Germany and the Asia-Pacific: is there life beyond trade?
Germany is often described as a ‘civilian power and ‘value-oriented actor, one that
emphasizes diplomacy, economic cooperation and multilateralism as the appropriate
instruments for strengthening international peace and security (Harnisch and Maull
2001; Wolff 2013). In addition to that, its interest in fueling its export driven economy
can sometimes lead Germany to prioritize beneficial trade agreements over the promo-
tion of international norms and thus work against its civilian power image. Both its
trade interests and its civilian power identity mediate Germany’s conception of the
Asia-Pacific and its engagement in that region.
Germany’s relations in the Asia-Pacific are characterized by its strong economic ties
with the region and its special relationship with China, which is currently the second most
important market outside Europe (after the US) for German exports. In 2011, China has
become the so-far only East Asian country with which Germany holds annual
government-to-government consultations (Regierungskonsultationen). These consulta-
tions, which are in effect joint cabinet meetings, probably best illustrate the high status
which Germany ascribes to its relations with China and demonstrate the depth and
comprehensiveness of this ‘special’ relationship (Heiduk 2015; Kundnani 2014).
Germany has a strong interest in strengthening bilateral and multilateral cooperation
with its Asia-Pacific partners to tackle global security challenges such as climate
change, piracy or cybercrime. 10 However, Berlin has been somewhat reluctant to
engage in regional security issues proper. Some analysts have even alluded to the fact
7 Authors’ interviews with multiple French defence foreign policy and defence officials in Paris, May 2014-
May 2015.
8 Author’s interview with French Asia expert in Tokyo, 19 November 2014.
9 Author’s interviews with multiple Japanese foreign and defence policy officials in Tokyo, November 2013.
10 Authors’ interviews with multiple German foreign and defence policy officials in Brussels, May 2014-May
2015.
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that German officials tend to be ‘dismissive of the attempts by France and the UK to
play a role in regional security through defence cooperation with countries such as
Japan’ (Stanzel and Kundnani 2014). However, as Germany finds itself confronted
with growing security challenges in the European neighbourhood, it increasingly
perceives the Asia-Pacific as a source of diplomatic support. In fact, Germany has
considerably strengthened its security dialogues with East Asian countries to discuss
regional security challenges in Ukraine, the Middle East or North Africa (Stanzel and
Kundnani 2014; Pollmann (2015).
When it comes to security in the Asia-Pacific, Germany shows a clear preference for
multilateral settings. International security conferences, such as the Shangri-La dia-
logue and the Munich Security Conference, offer Germany a useful opportunity to
strengthen its security dialogue with Asian partners and emphasize the global nature of
such dialogue. Insofar as the Asia-Pacific proper is concerned, Germany has become
increasingly engaged in supporting efforts to strengthen regional integration, having
emphasized the need to strengthen the role and capacity of ASEAN (ASEAN 2015).
While Germany’s cooperation with ASEAN focuses primarily on questions related to
climate change, regional economic integration and institutional/capacity development,
bilateral exchanges also feature informal dialogues on regional and global security
issues, including the evolving situation in the South China Sea. Beyond its engagement
with ASEAN, Germany is a staunch supporter of current EU efforts to become a
member of the East Asia Summit and the ASEAN Defense Minister Meeting Plus
(ADMM+) and continues to advocate for the strengthening of multilateral security
institutions in the region.
In recent years, Germany has also made efforts to strengthen its bilateral security
dialogues in the Asia-Pacific. During government-to-government consultations in
2014, Germany and China agreed to expand their bilateral strategic dialogue and
strengthened its security dimension by holding a regular security dialogue between
representatives from both countries’ defence ministries. Also in 2014, Germany and
Japan agreed to hold bilateral Politico-Military (PM)/Military to Military (MM) con-
sultations, as well as a regular ‘Track 1.5 Japan-Germany Security Dialogue’ between
government officials.
To be sure, Germany’s bilateral security dialogues with China and Japan are rather
modest. On the one hand, the EU-wide arms embargo against China constitutes a clear
limitation to any meaningful security ties between Berlin and Beijing. On the other
hand, Japanese officials repeatedly insist that their bilateral military-strategic dialogue
with Germany remains far less advanced than that with France or the UK and perceive
Berlin’s economic and political closeness with Beijing as a clear obstacle to a truly
meaningful German–Japanese strategic dialogue. 11 In turn, the Republic of Korea
appears to be a more promising security partner for Germany. Germany’s history of
division and reunification make it a unique asset when it comes to advising South
Korea in its ambition to achieve a peaceful process of unification on the Korean
peninsula. In this context, Germany and South Korea set up an ‘advisory group on
the foreign policy considerations of the reunification of Korea’ in September 2014,
which might provide Germany with a privileged role in the Korean peace process.
11 Interview with multiple Japanese officials in Tokyo and Brussels, November 2014-January 2015.
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The EU and ‘East Asia : a security partnership in the making?
The EU’s foreign and security policy is most commonly characterized as being driven
by normative principles and the promotion of effective multilateralism (Manners 2002).
However, much as is the case with Germany, the EU’s value-driven approach and its
promotion of multilateral solutions are seen as being compromised by economic
interests, which play a crucial role in the EU’s relations with the Asia-Pacific
(Zimmermann 2007). Indeed, the EU’s strategy for East Asia (its preferred term to
designate the region) highlights the increasing importance of inter-regional trade, as
well as the interdependence between European prosperity and geopolitical stability in
East Asia (Council of the European Union 2012).
To date, the EU’s role in East Asian regional security affairs is a marginal one,
as illustrated by its exclusion from the main international fora in which Asian
security affairs are debated, namely the six-party talks with North Korea, the East
Asia Summit (EAS) or the ASEAN Defense Minister’s Meeting Plus (ADMM-
Plus). However, in its recent East Asia Policy Guidelines (Council of the
European Union 2012), the European Union has underlined its political and
economic interest in the region’s stability by highlighting its increasing depen-
dence on a stable trade flow with East Asia. Such stability is menaced by swelling
tensions and growing nationalism in the East and South China Sea, as well as by
the increasingly volatile situation in the Korean peninsula.
To be sure, a number of structural limitations stand in the way of a meaningful EU
security engagement in East Asia. One is the Union’s emphasis on its immediate
neighbourhood, especially in the context of mounting geopolitical instability in
Eastern Europe, North Africa and the broader Middle East. Another important factor
has to do with lack of progress in the framework of the Common Security and Defense
Policy (CSDP). Finally, and relatedly, divergent priorities amongst its leading member
states inhibit a coherent or, for that matter, strong EU security role in the Asia-Pacific.
This has been particularly visible in the EU’s ambivalent attitude towards the arms
embargo against China (Casarini 2007) or the debate over the China-led Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) (Renard 2015).
Despite these limitations, however, the EU’s ambition to position itself as a ‘credible
political and security actor in the region’ (European External Action Service 2014;
Council of the European Union 2015b) and the willingness of East Asian strategic
partners to become more active as global security providers may result in greater
security cooperation between both regions. In this regard, the EU has particularly
highlighted non-traditional security threats (NTSTs), such as the fight against piracy,
international terrorism, climate change, cyber crime and natural disasters, as potential
areas for inter-regional security cooperation (Council of the European Union 2012;
European External Action Service 2014). This is in fact something that resonates well
with the EU’s East Asian partners. In particular, the EU-led ATALANTA mission to
fight piracy off the coast of Somalia has provided a useful framework to promote
cooperation between the EU, Japan, South Korea and China (Reiterer 2014) Moreover,
the EU has undertaken steps to step up its cooperation with ASEAN in the area of
maritime surveillance, port security and disaster relief and increased its engagement in
strengthening regional maritime capacity building in South East Asia (Council of the
European Union 2012).
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One of the EU’s preferred tools to further develop its profile as an international
security actor in this regard is the so-called Framework Participation Agreement (FPA),
which establishes the legal foundation for third countries to get involved in EU crisis
management operations. In May 2014, South Korea became the first (East) Asian
country to sign an FPA with the EU, which further institutionalizes EU-ROK security
cooperation, especially at the operational level. Some scholars have referred to the FPA
as the ‘third pillar’ of the EU-ROK strategic partnership by adding a security dimension
to the general political framework and the bilateral free trade agreement (Minard &
Pejsova 2014). Currently, no other EU strategic partnership enjoys such a strong
institutional foundation. The EU envisions a similar agreement with Japan, which
promises to lead to a deepening in EU–Japan political, economic and security ties in
the coming years.12 The Abe administration’s ambition to strengthen Japan’s ‘Proactive
Contribution to Peace’ promises to facilitate greater EU–Japan security cooperation
(Council of the European Union 2015b)—a prospect from which both sides are likely
to benefit. An institutionalized security partnership with Tokyo might help boost the
EU’s profile as a security actor in East Asia.13
In November 2013, the EU and China adopted the so-called ‘2020 Strategic
Agenda’, which aims to strengthen bilateral cooperation in the area of global security,
with a special emphasis on transnational challenge (EEAS 2013). In recent years, both
parties have engaged in common efforts to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia, with
the People’s Liberation Army Navy contributing to the broader EU anti-piracy effort
escorting vessels from the World Food Programme. Beijing has also taken on an
increasingly active role in UN peacekeeping missions, thus opening further possibilities
for EU–China cooperation. After sending its first ever combat troops to join a UN
peacekeeping mission to Mali in 2013, China announced in September 2014 that it
would contribute a 700 personnel infantry battalion to the UN Mission in South Sudan
(UNMISS). However, anti-piracy efforts, notwithstanding its increasing engagement in
peacekeeping missions, have not yet led China to contribute to EU-led crisis manage-
ment operations. In this regard, it is important to note that the EU arms embargo against
China constitutes an important obstacle to the development of bilateral security coop-
eration.14
Insofar as regional territorial disputes are concerned, the EU has made it repeatedly
clear that it will ‘not in any sense take positions’ (Council of the European Union 2012)
or ‘get into the legitimacy of specific claims’ (European External Action Service 2015).
Instead, the EU has become an outspoken advocate for the need to maintain an
international maritime order based on the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea
(UNCLOS). It has further expressed its support for negotiations between China and
ASEAN to develop a Code of Conduct for maritime affairs and offered its assistance
and expertise for enhancing regional maritime security cooperation (Council of the
European Union 2012; European External Action Service 2015). Moreover, while
emphasizing the need for diplomatic solutions, the EU organized a training session
on preventive diplomacy and mediation in the framework of the ASEAN Regional
Forum (ARF) in 2014 (Reiterer 2014:18). Altogether, its approach of not taking
12 Authors’ interview with EU official in Brussels, 24 April 2015
13 Authors’ interview with EU official in Brussels, 27 November 2014.
14 Authors’ interview with EU official on 24 September 2015.
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positions in territorial disputes and instead emphasizing diplomacy and multilateral
solutions has partly led to the manifestation of the EU’s image as a ‘neutral’ or
‘impartial’ regional security actor in East Asia (see, for example, Pejsova 2014; Ueta
2013; Kundnani and Tsuruoka 2014; Youngs 2015), a position that is often viewed as
inherently linked to EU concerns about burdening its economic partnership with China
(Youngs 2015:11–12).
Finally, the EU’s role as a security actor in the region is increasingly shaped by its re-
engagement with ASEAN. Over the past decades, ASEAN has evolved as a key actor
in the development of East Asia’s regional security architecture and played a pivotal
role in connecting the wider East Asian region by setting up a number of regional
organizations, including the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), the East Asia Summit
and the ASEAN Defense Minister Meeting Plus (ADDM+). The EU has traditionally
perceived ASEAN as a natural partner in East Asia, not least given their similarities in
terms of status and mission, i.e. to promote regional integration and political cooper-
ation in their respective regions. However, it is only relatively recently that the Union
has focused on strengthening its bilateral strategic ties with ASEAN (Youngs 2015:13).
In May 2015, the EU proposed to bump up its relations with ASEAN to the level of a
strategic partnership and announced it would double its financial assistance to that
organization (Council of the European Union 2015a). In this regard, the EU decided to
appoint an ambassador to ASEAN, who took office in September 2015, and to
join ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC), a non-aggression and coop-
eration pact between ASEAN members. Moreover, the EU has become increasingly
outspoken in its support for East Asian regional integration, which it sees as the best
guarantee of economic prosperity and geopolitical stability over the medium and long
term, both in South East Asia and in East Asia more broadly (European External Action
Service). In this regard, its engagement with ASEAN is closely connected to its broader
ambition to become a member of the East Asia Summit and the ADDM+.15 Thus, the
EU perceives its relationship with ASEAN as a useful asset to strengthen its security
profile in East Asia.
Making sense of diversity: is there a ‘distinctively’ European security
approach towards the Asia-Pacific?
This section examines how the security roles of Europe’s main powers and institutions
in the Asia-Pacific intersect with each other, with a view to identifying some of the
main patterns of convergence and divergence. Figure 1 depicts the positions of the four
European actors under examination in light of their preferred regional partners and
means of engagement. The figure does not build on any quantitative data, but rather
draws on the above empirical analysis to illustrate, in a comparative fashion, how
Europe’s key actors position themselves vis-à-vis some of the key security issues in the
Asia-Pacific. In particular, it seeks to illustrate Europe’s approach(es) towards the four
main themes discussed throughout the article, i.e. the role of the US, China’s rise,
bilateralism vs. multilateralism and economic/diplomatic engagement vs. security and
15 The EU has repeatedly expressed its interest to be included in these regional organizations, both of which
include Russia and the US (Council of the European Union 2015).
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defence cooperation. It goes without saying that the categories depicted herein are
hardly ever exclusive. Figure 1 cannot possibly capture the complexity of every
individual European security approach towards the Asia-Pacific. For instance,
Britain’s security approach to the Asia-Pacific features a strong preference for bilater-
alism and greater closeness to the US. However, London is also supportive of multi-
lateralism, values greatly its economic (and political) ties with Beijing and features a
rather ambiguous stance vis-à-vis regional territorial disputes.
For the sake of visual clarity, Fig. 1 features only two axes. However, these two axes
are very much intertwined, and both are illustrative of European positions vis-à-vis the
four main themes identified. The vertical axis assesses the kind of regional partners
Europeans prioritize and to what extent that choice is informed by economic or security
considerations. An emphasis on traditional, like-minded partners bespeaks a preference
for bilateralism, greater closeness to the US and a certain degree of skepticism vis-à-vis
China. In turn, a focus on ‘economic partners’ indicates greater distance to the US, a
more ‘neutral’ approach towards China, and tends to be associated with a preference for
multilateralism. The horizontal axis assesses the preferred means of engagement in the
region, i.e. economic/diplomatic vs. security and defence cooperation. Given the
absence of strong regional multilateral security institutions, security and defence
cooperation often takes place on a bilateral basis. Those European actors who favour
bilateral security ties tend to somewhat mirror Washington’s own approach, i.e. em-
phasizing traditional, like-minded partners to the detriment of China, who is subject to
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Fig. 1 Positions of the four European actors under examination in light of their preferred regional partners and
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engagement in the Asia-Pacific to the diplomatic and economic level have a clear
preference for multilateral frameworks, show greater distance from America’s military
and alliance-based approach and a more neutral attitude towards China.
Britain’s approach towards the Asia-Pacific features an important emphasis on
bilateral security and defence cooperation with like-minded partners. Such approach
is largely mediated by its historical ties to its former colonies, its close bilateral strategic
ties to the US and its own condition as a maritime and global power. The strategic reach
in the Indian Ocean region, its ‘legacy alliances in South East Asia (with Singapore,
Malaysia and Brunei) and the South Pacific (Australia and New Zealand), its growing
interest in maritime security in South East Asia (exemplified by its engagement in
ReCAAP) and its efforts to deepen its bilateral strategic ties with Japan represent the
cornerstones of Britain’s security approach to the Asia-Pacific.
Notably, Britain’s approach to the Asia-Pacific is largely compatible with—and
indeed broadly mirrors—that of the US. Both Britain and the US emphasize the
geostrategic contiguity between the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean. As far as the
Indian Ocean is concerned, London and Washington share security partners in the
southern Persian Gulf, are both interested in expanding their bilateral strategic ties with
India and see the joint US–UK facility in Diego Garcia as a key asset in support of their
strategic projection alongside the ‘Indo-Pacific . Similarly, both the US and the UK
emphasize their strategic relationships with Australia and Singapore as the two main
‘gateways to the Indo-Pacific, as well as with Japan, with whom the US maintains an
alliance and the UK is currently developing its security ties. An important way of
strengthening these partnerships is through trilateral, quadrilateral and multilateral
naval exercises in the Indian Ocean, involving Indian, Australian, Japanese, US and
British vessels. However, in contrast to the US, Britain officially eschews any clear line
on territorial disputes in East Asia to avoid excessively alienating China. Furthermore,
London’s decision to join the Chinese-led AIIB, demonstrated its willingness to
disregard US warnings and put its own economics interests above security
considerations.
Germany’s security approach towards the Asia-Pacific is notoriously cautious.
Its engagement in the region is primarily confined to trade, and its diplomacy is
characterized by an emphasis on its main regional economic partners (esp. the so-
called special relationship with China) and a preference for multilateralism.
Germany has neither the capability nor the will to project strategic power into
the region and, unlike Britain (or France), has not shown a particular interest in
developing preferential security relationships with countries like Japan or
Australia. Germany takes part in some regional security dialogues (such as the
Shangri-La Dialogue) and supports the idea of greater EU engagement in regional
security, primarily through the furthering of diplomatic ties with ASEAN.
However, Berlin is particularly keen not to appear to be taking sides in any of
the region’s territorial conflicts, partly in order to avoid alienating any of its
partners and jeopardizing its strong economic position in the region.
Beyond the Asia-Pacific proper, a number of Asia-Pacific countries are developing a
greater economic and diplomatic interest in other parts of the world and becoming
increasingly interested in tackling global and transnational challenges. This process
presents some opportunities for Germany, which appears to be increasingly interested
in a broader security and political dialogue with its Asia-Pacific ‘partners . Currently,
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the bulk of Germany’s foreign and security policy energies are concentrated in Eastern
Europe and the Middle East. In that context, Berlin understands that its bilateral
relations with a number of Asia-Pacific partners can prove most resourceful in terms
of garnering diplomatic support for its initiatives in the broader European
neighbourhood, i.e. in its response to the evolving political situation in Ukraine or
the ongoing challenge of the Islamic State. More broadly, Germany takes a leading role
in advocating for greater international and multilateral cooperation in tackling non-
traditional global security threats, such as climate change, disaster relief and risk
management. In that context, its political ties to China and other Asia-Pacific partners
work in favour of its aim to promote effective multilateral responses.
France’s approach to Asia-Pacific security seems to lie somewhere in between
those of Britain and Germany, in that the country seeks to balance its emerging
bilateral security relationships with like-minded partners with an ongoing security
dialogue with China and an emphasis on multilateralism and diplomacy. France
has overseas territories in the South Pacific, and its colonial legacy lives on
through alliance commitments such as the Collective Security Treaty in South
East Asia or the presence of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam in the International
Organization of the Francophonie. Much as it is the case for Britain, the Indian
Ocean constitutes the main prism through which France looks at the Asia-Pacific.
However, France is primarily concerned with the western part of the Indian Ocean,
where most of its territories in that ocean are located.
Like Britain, France is also in the process of deepening its bilateral strategic ties to
key Indo-Pacific powers, namely India, Australia or Japan. However, in contrast to
Britain’s attempt to link those relations to the US and explore trilateral and quadrilateral
formats, France’s ties to these countries are primarily bilateral in nature. Furthermore,
they are generally more restricted in their geographical scope. The relationship with
India, for instance, is primarily confined to the Indian Ocean context and that with
Australia to the South Pacific. France's relationship with Japan focuses primarily on
defence-industrial issues and is in any case less advanced than Britain’s. In fact,
France’s parallel efforts to maintain a fluid security relationship with China constitute
a limitation to French–Japanese security relations. Arguably, the best illustration of this
problem is France’s ongoing transfer of dual-use capabilities to China, against which
Japan has consistently and vocally complained. Like Germany, France emphasizes
multilateralism and regional security cooperation and underscores the potential of the
EU in that regard.
France also enjoys strong security ties with the US. However, if Britain’s relation-
ship with the US is more global in scope, France’s is more restricted geographically and
is particularly strong now in Africa. In fact, when articulating its own security narrative
about the Asia-Pacific, France makes a consistent effort to distance itself from the US.
Notably, Paris emphasizes its ‘diplomatic and ‘multilateral credentials, and the fact
that they represent a clear contrast with Washington’s alliance-based approach, which
places greater emphasis on military power.
The plurality of views represented by Europe’s main powers may partly explain why
the EU can often appear modest—even equivocal—when articulating its strategies and
policies towards East Asia. Reflecting primarily German and, to a lesser extent, French
views, the EU’s understanding of East Asia is distinctively economic. The EU tends to
look at the region as a whole as an economic partner and build its security dialogues
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and security cooperation efforts on strong bilateral ties with their main trading partners
in North East Asia. The bilateral relationship with China stands out in terms of its
importance. Both Germany and France constantly insist that the EU’s security engage-
ment in the region must carefully take into account Chinese sensitivities. However, they
also have been increasingly active in promoting greater ties between the EU and
ASEAN, which could provide European with access to regional security fora in which
they are not represented, such as the East Asia Summit.
In yet another reflection of German and French views, the EU is focused on
expanding its participation in regional security fora and emphasizing the potential for
inter-regional cooperation in tackling ‘non-traditional’ security challenges such as
climate change and piracy. Relatedly, both Germany and the EU favour a ‘narrow’
conceptualization of East Asia, which contrasts with British and French efforts to cast
the region in a broader Indo-Pacific context.
The EU’s security role in East Asia is currently a marginal one. However, its
ongoing efforts to leverage its ‘strategic partnerships’ to expand its security cooperation
with some East Asian countries in other parts of the world may well contribute to
boosting the Union’s credibility in the region as a political and security actor. This, in
turn, could strengthen its own chances of becoming further integrated into existing
regional security dialogues, such as the East Asia summit. Moreover, the EU’s inclu-
sion in the ASEAN Regional Forum, its experience as an international mediator
(particularly in nuclear negotiations with Iran) and its security cooperation with its
East Asian partners in global and ‘non-traditional’ security issues could bolster the EU’s
profile as a security actor in the region.
Conclusion
This article has sought to determine to what extent we can speak of a distinctively
European security approach in the Asia-Pacific. To do so, it has examined the evolving
security role of Britain, France, Germany and the EU in the region. Some important
patterns of convergence have been identified. Critically, most Europeans tend to
emphasize the economic and diplomatic nature of their engagement in the region and
their preference for multilateral solutions. This contrasts with Washington’s alliance-
based approach and greater emphasis on military power. Most Europeans also eschew
the notion that China’s rise is inherently challenging for the regional and global order,
as illustrated by taking a clear stance on the question of territorial disputes in the Asia-
Pacific. These common traits form the foundation of a distinctively European security
approach to the Asia-Pacific, i.e. one that differs from that of the US and other regional
actors.
However, despite the existence of common traits, European security approaches
towards the Asia-Pacific continue to be characterized by important patterns of diver-
gence. As described in the previous section, Britain prioritizes bilateral security and
defence cooperation with traditional US allies and like-minded partners, while
Germany and the EU are focused on securing their diplomatic access to multilateral
regional organizations. Furthermore, Britain appears to favour continued development
of security relations through an Indo-Pacific framework, Germany and the EU seem to
develop their security cooperation efforts through upstaging bilateral relations with
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North East Asian countries and East Asian regional organizations. Within this frame-
work, France finds itself in the middle of the spectrum, which might position it well to
moderate future discussions on developing a European security strategy towards the
Asia-Pacific region. Thus, and despite the existence of some common parameters,
ongoing divergences prevent Europeans from speaking with one voice in the Asia-
Pacific, and playing a stronger security role in the region. This constitutes an important
limitation for the EU itself.
As already argued, Europe’s main powers perceive the EU as a useful tool to
emphasize the economic and diplomatic nature of their engagement in the region,
signal their differences with Washington’s more ‘militaristic’ and alliance-based ap-
proach and convey an image of geopolitical equidistance vis-à-vis regional security
questions. However, even those actors who show greater proclivity for engaging in
security and defence cooperation with selected partners (i.e. Britain and France) prefer
to do so bilaterally rather than through the EU framework. In this regard, we could
argue that the existence of a more coherent EU security approach to the Asia-Pacific is
hindered by two main factors. Firstly, and unsurprisingly, ongoing national differences
make it difficult to agree on a strong and coherent EU security role in the region.
Secondly, and perhapsmost interestingly, even those member states that show a greater
proclivity for engaging like-minded partners in security and defence cooperation prefer to
so bilaterally. This may well be explained by the fact that preserving the image of a
multilateral and neutral EU gives member states greater diplomatic versatility, i.e. by
allowing them to cast themselves in national or EU ‘clothing’, depending on the circum-
stances. Further research on British, French and German views on the EU’s security role
in the Asia-Pacific could help further illuminate this important question. Finally, a
comparative analysis of how Europeans and other ‘external’ actors (i.e. the US, Russia
and India) approach the regionmay provide further insights as to whether we can speak of
a distinctively European security approach towards the Asia-Pacific.
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